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Abstract		
	
Some	 commentators	 have	 characterised	 so-called	 ‘no-go’	 areas	 as	 sites	 in	 which	 the	
exercise	of	authority	is	prevented.	Here	we	suggest	that	many	such	spaces	are	produced	by	
state,	policing	and	citizen	repertoires	that	aim	to	minimise	the	costs	and	risks	of	engaging,	
supporting	 and	 servicing	 such	 spaces	 and	 their	 populations.	 In	 this	 article,	 we	 locate	
strategies	 of	 public	 spending,	 policing	 and	 political	 action	 that	 offer	 a	 governing	 logic	 in	
which	neighbourhoods	are	essentially	 subtracted	 from	the	constitution	of	 the	city.	During	
such	designations,	the	assurances	of	citizenship,	vitality	of	civic	institutions	and	presence	of	
policing	 may	 be	 partially	 or	 wholly	 suspended.	 We	 present	 a	 framework	 for	 the	
identification	of	such	strategies	 in	which	 these	 forms	of	social,	political	and	spatial	exiting	
are	described	as	being	autotomic	in	nature	–	spaces	that	are	ejected	in	order	to	avoid	losses	
or	 further	 damage	 to	 the	 body	 politic	 of	 the	 city	 in	ways	 akin	 to	 the	 response	 of	 certain	
animals	that	protect	themselves	from	predation	by	shedding	a	limb	or	body	part.	This	term	
adds	force	and	depth	to	assessments	of	the	ways	both	temporary	and	more	sustained	exits	
by	policing,	management	 and	 state	 servicing	are	designed	 in	order	 to	 avoid	 responsibility	
		
over	or	engagement	with	spaces		deemed	a	threat	in	order	to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	
remaining,	included	city.		
	
Introduction		
	
Urban	 studies	 has	 long	 been	 preoccupied	with	 changes	 in	 the	 form	 and	management	 of	
public	space,	particularly	the	way	its	increasing	regulation	appears	to	offer	insight	into	social	
fears	focused	on	disorder	(Gurr,	1968;	Pearson,	1987;	Sampson	and	Raudenbush,	1999)	and	
the	 increasing	 alignment	 of	 public	 space	 with	 market	 imperatives	 (Gottdiener,	 2000).	 A	
number	of	themes	can	be	identified	in	this	body	of	work.	First,	the	emergence	of	forms	of	
privatisation	 of	 the	 management	 and	 ownership	 of	 public	 spaces	 (Davis,	 1992),	 which	
suggest	that	its	rules	of	entry	have	changed	the	character	of	what	were	ordinarily	deemed	
spaces	open	to	all.	Second,	an	emphasis	on	consumption	is	understood	to	have	diminished	
the	role	of	public	spaces	as	sites	of	political	contestation,	participation	and	social	spectacle	
that	in	some	cases	have	also	been	more	aggressively	policed	(Low	and	Smith,	2006;	Minton,	
2010).	 Third,	 urban	 and	 community	 safety	 agendas	 have	 become	 increasingly	 enmeshed	
with	 policy	 objectives	 focused	 on	 reducing	 disorder	 and	 promoting	 the	 economic	 and	
physical	 renewal	 of	 neighbourhoods	 and	 public	 spaces	 (Atkinson	 and	 Helms,	 2007).	 Here	
regimes	of	social	control	and	policing	are	connected	to	economic	well-being	and	a	need	to	
combat	the	visibility	of	crimes	that	might	threaten	disinvestment	or	foster	social	anxiety.		
	
Taken	 as	 a	whole,	 these	 various	 frameworks	 have	 tended	 to	 emphasise	 themes	 of	 social	
control	and	access	as	 contested	aspects	of	public	 space	and	urban	governance	 strategies,	
alongside	ongoing	concerns	about	participation	and	exclusion.	Building	on	this	context,	we	
		
reverse	 these	 perspectives	 to	 ask	 whether	 many	 areas	 of	 profound	 social	 exclusion	 and	
damaged	 cohesion	 receive	 harsher	 and	 more	 exclusionary	 strategies	 by	 stretched	 or	
antagonistic	 political	 and	 policy	 machineries.	 Going	 further,	 might	 not	 the	 ceding	 of	
controls,	 reductions	to	core	social	services	and	permitted	disorder	be	adopted	as	de	facto	
methods	 for	 the	management	 of	 what	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 ungovernable	 populations	 and	
declining	spaces?		
	
In	 this	 article,	 we	 suggest	 that	 withdrawal,	 avoidance,	 defunding	 and	 ‘managed	 decline’	
have	become	latent	policies	in	some	jurisdictions;	our	aim	here	is	to	offer	a	framework	for	
analysing	 these	 processes.	 Our	 main	 argument	 is	 that	 strategies	 of	 disinvestment	 and	
rejection	 can	 be	 identified	 in	 many	 aspects	 of	 urban	 management,	 policing,	 citizen	
disengagement	and	 the	 corporate	de-servicing	of	 sensitive	and	excluded	neighbourhoods.	
These	 themes	 have	 generated	 increasing	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 recent	 years,	 such	 as	 the	
examination	 by	 Mukhija	 and	 Mason	 (2013)	 of	 the	 non/de-annexation	 of	 poorer	 areas	
adjacent	 to	 existing	 incorporated	 cities	 in	 the	 US	 and	 work	 on	 the	 unserviced	 areas	 of	
Manila	(Shatkin,	2004).	These	political	makings	and	un-makings	of		delineations	concerning	
that	 which	 is	 in	 or	 outside	 geographical	 control	 have	 long	 been	 a	 feature	 of	 urban	
governance	 and	 citizen	 attitudes	 to	 particular	 spaces	 but	 have	 accelerated	 following	 the	
market	orientations	of	much	of	urban	governance	from	the	1970s	onwards	(Castells,	1997).	
Through	 such	 operations,	 socially	 stressed	 spaces	 are	 informally	 ejected	 from	 the	
responsibilities	 of	 the	 body	 of	 civic	 authority	 –	 a	 form	of	 unacknowledged	 de-annexation	
that	forms	the	focus	of	this	article.		
	
		
The	location	of	autotomic	strategies,	a	metaphor	that	underlies	the	key	contribution	of	this	
paper,	 appears	 to	 offer	 a	 promising	 framework	 for	 understanding	 how	 unruly	 space	 and	
abject	or	stigmatised	urban	environments	are	controlled.	Such	strategies	may	take	the	form	
of	an	elective	unburdening	of	state	sovereignty	and	capital	withdrawal	 that	operates	over	
varying	scales	and	timeframes.	As	we	discuss	here,	the	denial	of	particular	spaces	as	sites	of	
engagement,	 participation	or	 control	 appears	 to	be	 embraced	 at	 times	when	 such	 tactics	
may	better	maintain	the	order	and	coherence	of	the	remaining	city.	Thus,	citizenship	may	
be	 accorded	a	 kind	of	 conditional	 status,	 fracturing	more	 coherent	understandings	of	 the	
local/city	 state	 where	 designations	 of	 no-go	 space	 (such	 as	 restrictions	 on	 policing,	
insurance	 provisions	 or	 services	 such	 as	 taxis	 and	 postal	 or	 food	 deliveries)	 or	 reduced	
maintenance	 (the	 defunding	 public	 housing	 or	 public	 services)	 are	 embraced	 on	 the	
understanding	 that	 the	 residents	 or	 users	 of	 that	 space	 have	 foregone	 rights	 to	 inclusion	
and	personal	safety;	this	paradoxical	thesis	of	control	through	abandonment	forms	the	basis	
of	the	analysis	we	now	present.		
	
1.	Historical	strategies	of	incorporation	and	ejection		
	
Views	of	 the	 state	as	a	hermetically	 sealed	 ‘power	container’	have	 remained	dominant	 in	
social	 and	 political	 theory	 for	many	 years	 (Mann	 and	 Elton,	 1986;	 Tilly,	 1990).	Models	 of	
state	power	 tend	to	privilege	 the	 territorial	deployment	of	 force,	often	disregarding	more	
subtle	methods	of	discipline	and	control	that	go	beyond	the	raw	play	of	force	and	violence	
(Foucault,	 2008).	 However,	 instead	 of	 arguing	 that	 an	 analysis	 of	 force	 by	 government	 is	
simply	 misplaced	 in	 the	 urban	 context,	 we	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	 value	 in	 appreciating	
		
methods	 of	 military-style	 containment	 found	 in	 expeditionary,	 colonial	 and	 counter-
insurgency	conflicts	(Graham,	2010)	now	used	in	many	urban	contexts	globally.		
	
Military	commanders	with	limited	forces	at	their	disposal,	large	territories	to	control,	and	an	
indeterminate	and	resourceful	enemy	closely	monitor	the	costs	and	benefits	of	entering	and	
occupying	 particularly	 dangerous	 spaces.	 For	 example,	 the	 military	 ‘cordon	 sanitaire’,	
intended	 by	Woodrow	Wilson	 to	 create	 a	 democratic	 ‘no-man’s	 land’	 between	 East	 and	
West	Europe,	was	later	elaborated	by	the	US	during	the	Cold	War	to	achieve	the	wider	aim	
of	containing	potentially	aggressive	forces	 (Stråth,	2002).	The	origins	of	the	phrase	can	be	
traced	 to	 the	 French	 medical	 term	 for	 a	 quarantine	 zone	 aimed	 at	 isolating	 the	 sick	 or	
contagious	public	from	its	healthy	counterparts.	One	of	the	most	famous	examples	of	such	
practices	is	the	English	village	of	Eyam	in	Derbyshire,	which		agreed	to	seal	itself	off	from	the	
surrounding	 population	 during	 the	Great	 Plague	 of	 1666	 until	 the	 pestilence	 had	 passed.	
Only	one	quarter	of	the	residents	survived,	but	the	plague	did	not	spread	to	the	surrounding	
villages,	confirming	the	utility	of	population	quarantine	in	epidemic	disease	control	(Byrne,	
2008:	136).		
	
If	we	examine	 institutions	of	containment	and	control	associated	with	 refugee	camps	and	
reservations,	we	 find	 that	both	derive	 from	the	military	 state’s	 strategic	desire	 to	confine	
not	only	enemy	combatants,	but	more	importantly,	entire	populations	from	which	insurgent	
threats	 are	 believed	 to	 stem.	 Thus,	 the	 forcible	 imprisonments	 of	 Afrikaner	 and	 native	
African	men,	women	and	children	within	the	first	 large-scale	‘concentration	camps’	by	the	
British	 army	 during	 the	 Boer	 War1	 were	 forerunners	 of	 the	 ‘protected	 villages’	 strategy	
adopted	 first	 by	 the	 British	 military	 in	 Malaya	 (the	 Briggs	 plan)	 (Mockaitis,	 1990)	 and	
		
subsequently,	by	the	US	military	in	Vietnam	(the	Agroville	or	Strategic	Hamlet	programme),	
where	entire	communities	were	held	prisoner	by	government	forces	in	order	to	prevent	the	
infiltration	and	recruitment	of	villages	and	to	deny	the	enemy	shelter.		
	
The	use	of	reserves,	reservations	and	other	compulsory	settlements	as	techniques	of	ethnic	
concentration	 and	 cleansing	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 colonial	 occupation	 of	 aboriginal	 lands	 in	
present	day	North	and	South	America,	 Southern	Africa,	 South	Asia	 and	Oceania.	 In	 South	
Africa,	where	the	institution	of	Bantustans	was	intended	to	legitimate	an	Apartheid	system	
through	the	institution	of	‘native	self-government’,	these	reservations	evolved	into	pseudo-
sovereign	 areas	 around	 which	 the	 systematic	 oppression	 of	 the	 majority	 Black	 African	
population	 could	 be	more	 effectively	 organised	 (Evans,	 2012).	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 European	
context,	the	emergence	of	the	Ghetto	in	sixteenth	century	Venice	established	an	early	form	
of	 biopolitical	 control	 (Wacquant,	 2008).	 The	 revival	 of	 the	 ghetto	 by	 the	Nazi	 state	 as	 a	
compulsory	geography	of	abjection	seems	at	odds	with	the	appropriation	of	the	term	in	the	
American	context	as	a	kind	of	elective	ethnic	community.	However,	 the	transformation	of	
the	American	Ghetto	as	a	space	of	escape	and	relative	freedom	for	southern	blacks	into	the	
hyperghetto	of	declining	economic	opportunity,	prejudice	and	social	divestment	established	
an	 increasing	de	 facto	 spatial	 apartheid	 (Massey	and	Denton,	1998)	 that	 is	of	 course	also	
relevant	 to	 our	 analysis	 here.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 middle-class	 and	 white	 flight,	 official	
intervention	in	these	spaces	was	muted	at	best,	and	they	more	often	saw	significant	flight	of	
services	by	both	governments	and	populations.	
	
Under	both	repressive	and	more	liberal	state	apparatuses,	it	is	possible	to	identify	strategies	
of	containment	and	displays	of	symbolic	force	against	potentially	resistant	bodies,	whether	
		
through	the	criminal	justice	system,	mental	health	jurisdictions	(Foucault,	2012)	or	morally	
inflected	programmes	targeting	drug	users	(McCann,	2008).	Rancière	discussed	this	‘police’	
function	of	 the	state	 in	order	 to	achieve	a	 ‘society	 [that]	 is	a	 totality	comprised	of	groups	
performing	 specific	 functions	 and	 occupying	 determined	 spaces’	 (2000).	 He	 argues	 that	
those	who	seek	to	move	from	these	positions	are	deemed	to	present	a	challenge	to	social	
order	and	the	hegemony	of	the	state.	For	the	field	of	bourgeois	or	elite	politics,	the	claims	
of	 populations	 labelled	 as	 insurgent	 or	 threatening	 can	 subsequently	 be	 combatted	 or	
managed	by	their	apparent	unwillingness	to	be	assimilated	into	conventional	society.		
	
Notions	of	the	‘policeable’	city	thus	contrast	with	more	dangerous	territories	that	must	be	
partitioned	 and	 controlled.	 The	 state’s	 interpretation	 of	 dissent	 is	 often	 built	 around	 the	
sense	 of	 a	 symbolic	 challenge	 to	 its	 authority	 that	 cannot	 be	 countenanced	 due	 to	 its	
necessary	claim	to	be	able	to	claim	sovereign	control	over	all	spaces	within	its	jurisdiction.	
This	 interpretation	 can	 generate	 one	 of	 two	 outcomes.	 First,	 the	 functions	 of	 policy	 and	
policing	can	be	amplified	to	enforce	the	subjection	of	spaces	and	their	resident	bodies,	or	
second,	as	we	argue	here,	a	similarly	powerful	response	lies	in	devising	autotomic	strategies	
in	which	spaces	are	avoided	or	abandoned	to	reinforce	control	over	a	more	circumscribed	
area	while	demonising	and	portraying	calls	for	support	by	the	population	of	areas	ejected	as	
illegitimate.		
	
To	illustrate	this	first	type	of	autotomic	response	in	more	detail,	we	use	examples	of	‘no-go	
neighbourhoods’	in	Northern	Ireland	around	the	time	of	the	‘Bloody	Sunday’	events	in	the	
early	1970s,	and	 in	the	second,	the	more	recent	history	of	 ‘dangerous’	neighbourhoods	 in	
the	 historic	 centre	 of	 Mexico	 City.	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 we	 examine	 how	 military	 evolved	
		
practices	of	containment	and	armed	intervention	were	used	against	so-called	hostile	civilian	
communities	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 ordinary	 police	 deployments.	 The	 choice	 of	
Northern	 Ireland	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 illustrative	 rather	 than	 a	 limited	 case.	 Had	 space	
permitted,	 we	might	 have	 included	 equally	 relevant	 examples	 of	 militarized	 ‘retreat	 and	
surge’	 style	 tactics	 that	have	been	adopted	by	 the	police	and	national	guard	 in	prolonged	
periods	 of	 urban	unrest	 in	 jurisdictions	 such	 as	 the	United	 States	 from	 the	Watts	 riots	 in	
California	 of	 1965	 to	 the	 more	 recent	 events	 of	 Ferguson,	 Missouri	 and	 the	 wider	
#blacklivesmatter	 protests	 across	 urban	 America.	 Northern	 Ireland	 during	 the	 era	 of	 the	
Troubles	thus	serves	here	a	heuristic	device	or	prototype	of	the	normalization	of	exceptional	
state	violence	and	what	writers	such	as	Graham	(2009)	and	Weizman	(2007)	have	termed	
the	emergence	of	‘killing	space’	or	‘kill	space’	where	no	necessary	distinction	is	to	be	made	
between	enemy	combatants	and	the	surrounding	civilian	population.	
	
Our	choice	of	Mexico	City	aims	at	highlighting	another	aspect	of	autotomy	that	 relates	 to	
the	strategic	segregation	of	the	policed/policeable	city	from	the	unpoliced/unpoliceable	city	
according	to	Ranciere’s	formulation.	As	we	shall	see	in	the	case	of	La	Merced	district,	here	
ejection	takes	the	form	of	strategic	divestment	and	abandonment	through	the	inadequate	
provision	of	public	services	and	infrastructure	and	weak/selective	law	enforcement.	At	the	
same	 time,	 this	 marginal	 space	 close	 to	 the	 formal	 political	 and	 commercial	 centre	 of	
Mexico	 City	 remains	 potentially	 incorporable	 through	 state-led	 gentrification	 and	
exceptional	state	interventions	against	the	informal	land	holding	economy	that	sustains	this	
complex	 semi-licit	 economy.	 These	 liminal	 spaces,	 many	 of	 which	 exist	 in	 the	 rapidly	
growing	 metropoles	 of	 the	 Global	 South,	 thus	 have	 a	 vitality	 and	 dynamism	 that	 is	
simultaneously	the	product	of	an	underground	economy	and	a	transient	population,	which	
		
both	 challenges	 the	 formal	 economy	 and	 political	 power	 while	 offering	 the	 potential	 for	
profitable	incorporation	and	absorption.		
	
Our	case	studies	are	thereby	intended	to	offer	insights	into	why	and	how	no-go	spaces	are	
demarcated,	and	critically,	how	strategies	of	ejection	may	give	rise	to	powerful	methods	of	
governance,	despite	 their	paradoxical	 implementation	by	apparently	 sovereign	powers.	 In	
order	 to	 situate	 the	practice	of	autotomy	within	a	broader	understanding	of	 the	 strategic	
control	of	sui	generis	 ‘state	space’,	we	begin	with	a	brief	discussion	of	public	space	before	
moving	to	our	two	case	examples.	
	
2.	Included,	excluded	and	rejected	spaces	
	
Defining	public	space	is	problematic,	as	it	is	generally	accepted	to	be	space	not	necessarily	
publicly	 owned,	but	which	 is	 publicly	 accessible.	 Such	notions	 are	 inherent	 in	 the	policies	
and	practice	 statements	 in	countries	 like	 the	UK,	where	public	 space	management	 is	now	
intimately	 connected	 with	 approaches	 to	 liveability,	 economic	 development,	 and	
particularly	to	crime	control	(Atkinson	and	Helms,	2007).	For	Low	and	Smith	(2006),	public	
space	 is	 a	 historically	 complex	 and	 contested	 phenomenon	 ‘bound	 up	 with	 the	 contrast	
between	public	and	private	space’	(p.4).	They	then	turn	to	debates	about	civil	society,	state,	
market	 and	 the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 complex	 forms	 of	 public	 and	 private	 micro	
management	and	ownership	implemented	in	many	public	spaces.	Like	other	commentators,	
they	argue	that	fundamental	collective	rights	to	protest	and	dissent	are	unthinkable	without	
public	 space.	 However,	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	many	 public	 spaces	 has	 changed	 via	 leasing	 to	
private	developers	in	numerous	cities,	including	Melbourne,	Sydney,	Los	Angeles,	New	York,	
		
London,	Birmingham	and	Sheffield	(Minton,	2010).	In	many	cities,	what	was	once	public	has	
been	ceded	to	private	control	by	resident	and	developer/management	bodies.	Even	where	
many	 streets	 and	 squares	 remain	 in	 public	 ownership,	 innovations	 like	 Business	
Improvement	Districts	 (BIDs)	 in	 the	US	and	UK	or	 the	use	of	Street	Wardens	have	blurred	
the	traditional	boundaries	of	management.	Security	is	also	provided	privately	in	many	public	
areas,	 so	 that	 safety	has	become	 less	of	 a	public	 right	 (Zedner,	 2003),	 and	 in	 some	 cases	
access	to	security	is	becoming	a	kind	of	club	good,	brokered	by	the	ability	to	afford	entry	to	
bubbles	 of	 safety	 in	 predictable	 and	 secured	 spaces	 (Hope,	 2000).	 Despite	 public	 space	
appearing	to	be	an	open	and	shared	asset,	our	social	backgrounds	offer	particular	vantage	
points	 from	 which	 avoidance	 behaviours	 (of	 particular	 neighbourhoods)	 and	 security	
measures	are	implemented	(San-Juan,	Vozmediano	and	Vergara,	2012).			
	
Assimilationist	 techniques	 appear	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 attempted	 and	 to	 succeed	 where	
counter-public	space	is	adjacent	to	or	at	least	within	strategic	range	of	‘policeable	society’.	
Where	 assimilation	 and	 integration	 may	 seem	 impossible	 to	 sustain,	 too	 costly	 to	
implement	 in	 terms	 of	 redevelopment	 or	 policing,	 or	 unlikely	 to	 yield	 a	 planning	 gain	 in	
terms	of	 tax	 receipts	or	 land-value	appreciation,	we	argue	 that	 the	 resultant	containment	
strategy	 is	more	 likely	to	take	the	form	of	the	ghetto-camp,	where	a	suspension	of	norms	
and	rules	 is	tolerated	alongside	violent	periodic	police	 interdictions	aimed	at	restoring	the	
authority	and	dignity	of	the	state.	We	acknowledge	that	these	themes	are	long-standing	but	
suggest	that	debates	about	the	nature	of	contemporary	public	space	have	tended	to	stress	
either	the	punitive	control	and	pacification	of	space	(Smith,	1996;	Allen,	2006)	or	its	ongoing	
role	 as	 a	 site	 of	 cosmopolitanism	 and	 encounter	 (Bannister,	 Fyfe	 and	 Kearns,	 2006;	
Anderson,	2012).	Widely	shared	understandings	of	public	space	as	ungovernable,	dangerous	
		
and	 which	 prohibit	 the	 presence	 of	 outsiders	 may	 instead	 drive	 responses	 of	 formal	
ejection,	 rather	 than	 more	 expensive	 methods	 of	 control	 or	 the	 deployment	 of	 lengthy	
programmes	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 achieving	 some	 form	 of	 social	 inclusion	 (though	 we	
acknowledge	the	ambitious	nature	of	such	programmes	in	certain	jurisdictions).	Daily	policy	
decisions,	particularly	at	the	level	of	local	governments,	policing	departments	or	forces	and	
by	other	citizens	may	take	the	form	of	defunding	of	capital	projects	and	services,	curfews,	
the	withdrawal	of	policing	actions	(Keith,	1991;	Lea,	2002)	or	everyday	voluntary	decisions	
to	avoid	such	spaces	by	non-residents.		
	
The	 resulting	 patchwork	 of	 included	 and	 rejected	 spaces	 recalls	 the	 kinds	 of	 spatial	
injunctions	and	legal	frameworks	of	Agamben’s	notion	of	the	ban	in	the	customs	and	laws	of	
German	antiquity	(Agamben,	1998:	104-5).	We	can	extend	Agamben’s	notion	of	peaceless	
(friedlos)	spaces,	whereby	state	institutions	produce	new	forms	of	encampment	subtracted	
from	the	socio-political	formation	of	the	city	and	in	which	residents	are	subjected	to	extra-
legal	forms	of	policing	or	its	suspension.	Such	designations	exist	in	the	portrayal	of	the	slums	
that	 emerges	 in	 cinematic	 treatments	 like	Elite	 Squad	 or	Bus	 174,	 in	which	 residents	 are	
deemed	 compliant	 with	 drug	 dealers	 and	 available	 as	 collateral	 damage	 by	 paramilitary	
police	 units—a	 practice	 confirmed	 in	 more	 recent	 sociological	 studies	 of	 marginal	 urban	
spaces	 in	 São	 Paulo	 (Feltran,	 2011).	 In	 other	 words,	 peaceless,	 ejected	 space	 exists	 as	 a	
hidden	element	of	 the	broader	 ‘matrix	and	nomos	 [law]	of	 the	political	 space’	 (Agamben,	
1998:	166).		
	
Camp-like	spaces	constitute	exceptional	sites	where	inhabitants	are	afforded	only	the	status	
of	 ‘bare	 life’	 in	 which	 the	 normal	 operation	 of	 law,	 regulation	 and	 social	 support	 is	
		
suspended	(Agamben,	1998).	Yet	such	 impositions	are	never	complete	or	enduring.	This	 is	
because	 strategies	 of	 encampment	 –	 from	 the	 management	 of	 prisons	 and	 detention	
centres	 to	 the	policing	of	 ghettos,	 slums	and	unruly	 areas	 –	 are	highly	 labour	 and	 capital	
intensive	and	prone	to	failure	and	crisis.	Similarly,	the	counter-publics	and	insurgent	spaces	
identified	 by	 local	 governments,	 citizens	 and	 service	 providers	 can	 never	 be	 entirely	
excluded	 –	 by	 police	 crackdowns,	 housing	 policies	 and	 so	 on.	 Therefore,	we	 suggest	 that	
intense,	constant	and	forceful	interventions	in	‘hard	to	police’	unruly	public	spaces	give	rise	
to	an	identifiable	and	opposing	logic	based	on	a	process	of	rejection	in	which	state,	policy	
and	 policing	 interventions	 are	 absented	 from	 such	 spaces.	 Such	 autotomic	 strategies	 are	
made	manifest	 in	 temporary	 or	 sustained	 de-policing,	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 private	 services	
(taxis,	 insurance	 services)	 and	 the	 wider	 avoidance	 of	 areas	 by	 the	 respectable	 citizenry	
outside	such	‘no-go’	areas.	 It	 is	to	the	concrete	manifestation	of	such	spaces	that	we	now	
turn.	
	
3.	Modes	of	enclosure,	annexation	and	autotomy	
	
Autotomic	 practices	 and	 discursive	 formations	 tend	 to	 build	 on	 longer-running	 narratives	
surrounding	the	idea	of	ungovernable	and	deviant	no-go	spaces	and	populations,	which	are	
often	 ‘ruled’	 by	 dangerous	 groups.	 In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 this	 kind	 of	 reaction	 can	 be	
traced	 back	 to	 the	 early	 1970s,	 when	 the	 question	 of	 Republican	 enclaves	 in	 Northern	
Ireland	 was	 the	 source	 of	 much	 anxious	 discussion	 in	Westminster.	 References	 to	 no-go	
areas	were	then	picked-up	again	by	the	press	and	parliament	in	the	early	1980s	in	relation	
to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 inner	 cities,	 policing	 and	 the	 series	 of	 significant	 ‘disturbances’	 in	
Bristol	 and	 Brixton,	 London.	 In	 these	 contexts,	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 a	 space	where	 agents	 of	
		
state	control	could	not	be	sent	other	than	en	masse	and	of	ungovernable	populations	was	
seen	as	an	untenable	threat	to	the	functions	and	dignity	of	government	and	the	law	(Hall	et	
al.,	 2013).	 These	 and	 other	 states	 of	 emergency	 that	 generate	 declarations	 of	 autotomic	
reactions	to	dangerous	spaces	and	counter-publics	(most	recently,	the	temporary	drawback	
of	policing	 in	 the	 immediate	aftermath	of	 the	2011	 riots,	The	Guardian/LSE,	 2011:	 18-20)	
provide	a	rich	space	to	develop	ideas	about	the	nature,	limits	and	priorities	of	urban	studies.	
	
Discursive	 responses	 that	 underlie	 processes	 of	 autotomy	 can	 be	 located	 in	 media	 and	
political	 actors’	 descriptions	 of	 decaying	 public	 spaces,	 neighbourhoods	 and	 streets	 being	
‘taken-over’	by	the	deviant,	 in	the	extensive	street	presence	of	the	poor,	the	disorderly	or	
criminal.	At	 times,	 the	boundaries	of	 these	social	and	economic	barriers	between	 the	city	
and	 its	 other	 are	 literally	 made	 concrete,	 such	 as	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 notorious	
Cutteslowe	Walls	in	1930s	Oxford,	separating	an	existing	council	housing	estate	from	a	new,	
exclusive,	private	development	using	a	 two	metre	high	spike-topped	wall	 (Collison,	1963).	
The	 enforced	 abjection	 of	 spaces	 may	 be	 further	 underwritten	 by	 the	 way	 welfare	 sees	
spatially	 targeted	 reductions	 and	 by	 the	 kind	 of	 incarcerating	 spaces	 appended	 to	 these	
strategies	 (Wacquant,	2008).	 In	 this	deeper	processing	of	spaces	and	populations,	a	much	
broader	 sense	 of	 ejection	 from	 the	 polity	 is	 achieved	 by	 the	 retrenchment	 of	 welfare	
programs,	 concentrated	 areas	 of	 public	 housing	 provision	 and	 enormously	 restrictive	
conditions	for	those	most	in	need.	In	other	words,	autotomic	spaces	can	also	be	identified	
via	the	spatial	operations	of	the	stripped-down	welfare	state	promoted	under	conditions	of	
neoliberalism.	 Public	 housing	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 this	 process	 since	 it	 contains	 and	
maintains	a	population	that	 incites	 fear,	but	 in	spaces	that	are	maintained	on	 increasingly	
minimal	 revenue	 (Macek,	 2006).	 In	 the	 following	 two	 case	 studies,	 we	 examine	 these	
		
practices	in	more	detail,	first	in	an	analysis	of	‘no-go	areas’	in	Northern	Ireland	around	the	
time	 of	 the	 events	 of	 ‘Bloody	 Sunday’,	 and	 second,	 in	 an	 examination	 of	 two	 informal	
market	districts	in	the	historic	centre	of	Mexico	City.	
	
3.1	Case	Study	1:	‘Free	Derry’	and	Bloody	Sunday.		
	
The	 Northern	 Ireland	 conflict,	 known	 colloquially	 as	 ‘the	 Troubles’,	 has	 a	 long	 and	 bitter	
history	 rooted	 in	 the	 legacy	 of	 colonialism,	 religious	 divisions	 and	 armed	 violence	 on	 the	
part	 of	 state	 and	 paramilitary	 organisations.	 As	 the	 Saville	 Report	 of	 the	 Bloody	 Sunday	
Inquiry	 into	 the	 events	 of	 30	 January,	 1972,	 in	 Londonderry/Derry	 found,	 the	 majority	
nationalist	population	in	Northern	Ireland’s	second	largest	city	had	been	on	the	front	line	of	
an	increasingly	violent	conflict	between	the	police	and	the	security	forces	since	the	riots	of	
October	1968	and	the	subsequent	 launch	of	the	civil	rights	movement	and	the	creation	of	
the	 Derry	 Citizens’	 Defence	 Association	 in	 1969.	 	 However,	 police-community	 relations	
within	 the	 nationalist	 community	 had	 been	 identified	 as	 a	 problem	 even	 before	 the	 civil	
rights	movement	came	into	being.	As	one	author	writes:	
	
The	 Catholic	 community	 had	 an	 ambivalent	 attitude	 towards	 policing.	 […]	 Three	
months	before	the	first	Derry	civil	rights	march,	the	Foyle	Hill	II	tenants’	association	
was	 campaigning	 for	 regular	police	patrols	of	 the	estate.	 Six	days	after	 the	march,	
over	 a	 hundred	 people	 gathered	 outside	 the	 Guildhall	 to	 protest	 against	 police	
brutality	(Prince,	2007:	163-4).	
	
		
The	maiden	speech	of	the	civil	rights	activist	Bernadette	Devlin,	elected	at	the	age	of	21	as	
an	Independent	Unity	candidate	for	Mid-Ulster,	during	a	by-election	in	April	1969	put	 into	
stark	relief	the	challenge	facing	the	Stormont	government	and	the	British	government	that	
would	eventually	be	forced	to	replace	it:	
	
Short	 of	 producing	 miracles	 such	 as	 factories	 overnight	 in	 Derry	 and	 homes	
overnight	 in	 practically	 every	 area	 of	Northern	 Ireland,	what	 can	we	do?	 If	 British	
troops	 are	 sent	 in	 I	 should	 not	 like	 to	 be	 either	 the	 mother	 or	 sister	 of	 an	
unfortunate	soldier	stationed	there	(cited	in	Coogan,	1995:	74).	
	
By	 August,	 Devlin	 was	 leading	 ‘the	 Bogsiders’	 resistance	 in	 the	 main	 war-zone	 area	 of	
Rossville	 Street’	 from	whose	 high-rise	 flats	 young	 Catholics	 pelted	 the	 police	 with	 petrol	
bombs	while	the	RUC	responded	with	CS	gas.	For	the	next	48	hours,	the	rioting	continued	
with	 such	 intensity	 that	 Prime	 Minister	 Harold	 Wilson	 and	 his	 Home	 Secretary	 James	
Callaghan	agreed	to	allow	the	deployment	of	troops	across	the	province	where	in	cities	such	
as	Belfast,	the	situation	was	closer	to	a	violent	uprising	(Coogan,	1995:	76-77)	
	
By	January	1972,	the	situation	in	Derry/Londonderry	had	become	even	more	serious.	By	this	
stage,	 the	Nationalist	 community	had	 largely	 turned	against	 the	British	military,	 originally	
deployed	to	protect	local	Catholics	from	Loyalist	attacks;	many	believed	the	Army	as	well	as	
the	RUC	were	agents	of	an	oppressive	foreign	government	they	refused	to	recognise.	Parts	
of	 the	 city	 to	 the	 west	 of	 the	 Foyle	 lay	 damaged	 by	 street	 battles	 between	 the	 security	
forces	and	groups	of	rioting	youths,	some	of	whom	were	volunteers	of	the	IRA	or	its	junior	
wing,	 the	 Fianna	 (known	 to	 soldiers	 and	 some	others	 as	 the	 “Derry	 Young	Hooligans”).	A	
		
large	part	of	the	nationalist	area	of	the	city	(especially	the	Bogside,	dominated	by	the	IRA)	
became	a	‘no	go’	area	where	ordinary	policing	could	not	be	conducted	and	where	even	the	
Army	ventured	only	by	deploying	large	numbers	of	soldiers	(Saville,	2010:	49).	As	Hennessey	
writes,	 ‘[t]he	process	 that	 led	 to	 the	deployment	of	 1	 PARA	 in	Derry	 on	30	 January	 1972	
began	 with	 the	 State’s	 frustration	 that,	 by	 late	 1971,	 Londonderry	 had	 virtually	 seceded	
from	its	authority’	(Hennessey,	2007:	231).	
	
In	 the	 year	 preceding	Bloody	 Sunday,	 Reverend	 Ian	 Paisley,	 the	 leader	 of	 the	Democratic	
Unionist	Party,	wrote	an	editorial	in	the	Daily	Telegraph	on	23rd	March	that	claimed:	
	
The	so-called	'no	go'	areas	can	be	entered	by	the	police	with	heavy	military	escorts	
and	the	Army	can	drive	through	them	at	high	speed.	For	the	rest,	however,	they	are	
free	 from	 interference	 by	 the	 representatives	 of	 public	 power.	 Every	 writ	 that	 is	
successfully	 served,	every	distraint	 that	 is	 successfully	 carried	out	and	every	arrest	
that	 is	 made	 is	 nowadays	 carefully	 totted	 up	 to	 be	 paraded	 as	 proof	 that	 police	
authority	has	been	restored.	But	the	fact	remains	that	crime	flourishes	within	these	
fortresses.2	
	
Lord	 Balniel	 for	 the	 government	 rejected	 Ian	 Paisley’s	 claim	 that	 so-called	 ‘no	 go’	 areas	
existed	in	Northern	Ireland:		
	
I	 can	 only	 repeat	 the	 assurance	 which	 has	 been	 given	 repeatedly	 that	 there	 are	
absolutely	no	areas	where	 the	security	 forces	do	not	go	at	 their	will,	on	 foot	or	 in	
vehicles,	for	as	long	as	they	wish,	by	day	or	by	night.	Of	course,	as	the	hon.	Member	
		
for	 Antrim,	 North	 and	 my	 hon.	 Friend	 the	 Member	 for	 Surbiton	 (Mr.	 Fisher)	
mentioned,	 there	 are	 in	 certain	 areas,	 particularly	 in	 parts	 of	 Belfast,	 extreme	
difficulties	in	keeping	order.	That	is	because	there	is	only	limited	co-operation	from	
the	 local	 residents.	 If	we	 follow	 the	 right	 policies	 and	win	 the	 co-operation	of	 the	
local	residents,	and	if	gradually	they	come	to	look	on	the	police	as	being	their	natural	
protectors,	difficulties	of	restoring	order	in	these	areas	will	be	overcome.3			
	
Insert	Figure	1	about	here		
	
In	 reply	 to	 the	 Ulster	 Unionist	 MP,	 James	 Kilfedder’s	 charge	 that	 ‘there	 are	 areas	 in	
Northern	 Ireland	 today	which	 are	 no-go	 areas’,	 Prime	Minister	 Edward	Heath	was	 rather	
more	circumspect:	
	
The	question	of	the	no-go	areas	is	rather	wider	than	the	matters	Lord	Widgery	was	
dealing	 with.	 He	 sets	 out	 very	 clearly	 what	 his	 terms	 of	 reference	 were,	 how	 he	
interpreted	 them	and	how	he	explained	 them	to	all	 those	who	were	concerned	 in	
Londonderry	and	all	those	who	gave	evidence.	It	is	desirable	that	in	every	part	of	the	
United	Kingdom	it	should	be	possible	for	the	police	to	patrol	peaceably	and	maintain	
law	and	order	and	the	freedom	of	our	citizens.4		
	
The	Widgery	Report	was	as	widely	welcomed	by	Conservative	and	Unionists	politicians	as	it	
was	 condemned	 by	 Nationalist	 politicians	 and	 the	 bereaved	 families	 of	 the	 13	 victims	 of	
Bloody	 Sunday	 for	 finding	 that	 the	 army	 had	 behaved	 proportionately,	 lawfully	 and	
according	to	its	own	rules	of	engagement	in	the	face	of	hostile	enemy	fire.	Edward	Heath’s	
		
insistence	 that	 the	 territorial	 sovereignty	 of	 the	whole	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 should	 be	
reasserted,	if	necessary,	by	lethal	force	in	its	Irish	Republican	enclaves	sought	to	establish	a	
narrative	 of	 ‘normalcy’	 between	 the	 securitisation	 of	 insurgent	 space	 and	 the	 ‘policed’	
community	where	clearly	none	existed.	As	a	soldier	who	took	part	in	the	events	of	Bloody	
Sunday	told	the	Saville	Enquiry:		
	
There	was	concern	about	the	containment	line	following	the	lines	of	the	barricades.	
We	believed	there	would	be	a	reaction	out	of	the	IRA	because	we	would	be	‘invading	
their	turf’	when	going	in	for	the	arrest	operation.	We	therefore	had	an	expectation	
of	IRA	activity.	There	was	a	large	‘no	go’	area	and	I	can	recall	seeing	maps	with	the	so	
called	 containment	 line	 marked	 on	 them.	 Beyond	 those	 lines	 the	 security	 forces	
simply	did	not	go.	It	was	known	that	firefights	were	common	in	Londonderry	as	they	
were	 in	Belfast.	 If	 I	 remember	 rightly	 a	policeman	had	been	 shot	on	 the	Thursday	
before	we	went	in	(Saville,	2010:	458).		
	
The	decision	to	deploy	the	First	Parachute	Regiment	on	the	streets	of	the	Bogside	against	an	
unarmed,	 peaceful,	 civil	 rights	 demonstration	 as	 an	 ‘arrest	 squad’	 was	 palpably	 not	 a	
policing	operation	as	the	Irish	Government	drily	noted:		
	
The	actions	of	1	Para	itself,	the	degree	of	force	employed	(as	measured	in	terms	of	
civilians	dead	and	wounded),	the	absence	of	any	injury	to	security	force	personnel,	
and	the	description	of	what	happened	as	presented	by	highly	credible	eye	witnesses	
contrast	 so	 starkly	 with	 Lord	Widgery’s	 assertion	 that	 1	 Para	 was	 deployed	 as	 an	
arrest	force	that	it	now	simply	lacks	credibility	(Republic	of	Ireland,	1997:	59).		
		
	
The	 existence	 of	 ‘Free	 Derry’	 and	 the	 accumulation	 of	 months	 of	 hostile	 headlines	 and	
parliamentary	questions	pointing	to	the	alarming	rise	of	no-go	spaces	in	Londonderry/Derry,	
Belfast,	and	many	other	parts	of	the	Province	called	forth	an	exceptional	militarised	urban	
security	 operation	 that	 had	 previously	 only	 been	 instigated	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 first	 Irish	
Republican	 risings	 in	 1916,	 and	 subsequently,	 in	 a	 range	 of	 colonial	 counter-insurgency	
campaigns	in	South	and	East	Asia,	the	Middle	East	and	Cyprus.	
	
The	existence	of	officially	denied	no-go	spaces	leads	inexorably	to	the	erection	of	walls	and	
barriers	designed	to	keep	hostile	publics	apart,	but	these	so-called	 ‘peace	walls’	 inevitably	
follow	 state	 containment	 strategies	 that	 seek	 to	 separate	 the	policed	 from	 the	unpoliced	
and	 the	public	 from	 the	 counter-public,	memorably	 captured	 in	 the	photography	of	Olley	
and	Brett	(2007)	as	castles	along	a	frontline	of	defence	and	enclosure.	Various	studies	have	
found	that	such	 interface	communities	suffer	social	and	economic	disadvantage,	 including	
long-term	unemployment,	low	educational	achievement	and	poor	health,	lower	levels	of	car	
ownership	 and	 social	 mobility.	 Securitised	 interface	 areas	 are	 also	 characterised	 by	 the	
presence	 of	 bricked	 up	 or	 derelict	 buildings,	 empty	 ground	 or	 wasteland,	 graffiti	 and	
vandalism	–	a	pattern	of	 environmental	 and	 social	 blight	 that	 can	be	 found	around	other	
forms	of	state	enclosure	from	Palestine	to	the	US-Mexico	border	(Brown,	2010).	
	
It	 is	 therefore	 unsurprising	 that	 the	 most	 socially	 deprived	 and	 exclusively	
Catholic/Republican	 and	 Protestant/Loyalist	 neighbourhoods	 in	 Belfast’s	 frontier	 zones	
where	 security	 barriers	 and	 walls	 have	 been	 erected	 (ostensibly	 to	 protect	 the	 two	
communities	 from	 one	 another)	 also	 experienced	 the	 highest	 rates	 of	 civilian	 casualties	
		
during	 the	 Troubles.	 In	 fact,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 fatalities	 in	 Belfast	 during	 the	 conflict	
occurred	 within	 segregated	 communities	 composed	 of	 over	 90	 per	 cent	 Catholics	 or	
Protestants,	within	areas	of	high	deprivation	as	measured	by	the	Robson	index	and	close	to	
peacelines	(Mesev	et	al.,	2009;	see	also	Smyth	and	Hamilton,	2003:	30-31).		
	
Of	course,	it	is	possible	to	argue	that	high	levels	of	concentrated	deprivation	existed	prior	to	
the	Troubles,	but	this	signifies	a	 longer	running	 issue	of	religious	discrimination	and	social	
disadvantage	that	first	gave	rise	to	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	and	out	of	which	emerged	the	
paramilitary	conflict.	However,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	reduce	the	Northern	Ireland	conflict	
to	an	issue	of	‘violent	sectarianism’	in	the	context	of	a	centuries-long	strategy	of	control	and	
containment	where	both	 the	 state	and	organised	capital	have	been	 instrumental.	 Indeed,	
despite	 the	 Good	 Friday	 Agreement	 and	 the	 subsequent	 ceasefire	 by	 Republican	 and	
Loyalist	paramilitary	forces,	effective	policies	to	tackle	the	segregation	and	abandonment	of	
highly	deprived	communities	 failed	to	win	support	among	political	 leaders	 in	Westminster	
and	 Stormont	 because	 highly	 spatialised	 inter-communal	 enmity	 continues	 to	 generate	
significant	political	capital	for	all	the	principal	players	(Parker,	2011).5	
	
3.2	Case	study	2:	Avoiding	and	excluding	dangerous	space	in	the	historic	centre	of	Mexico	
City	
	
Mexico	 City	 is	 a	 place	 of	 contrasts	 that	 is	 facing	 a	 rise	 of	 crime	 and	 violence	 alongside	
increasing	 socio-economic	 inequality.	 The	 chaotic	 urban	 development	 has	 contributed	 to	
the	emergence	of	dangerous	neighbourhoods	in	the	city	edges	that	are	not	very	well	known	
by	most	 citizens	because	 they	are	distant.	However,	 there	are	other	 types	of	no-go	areas	
		
that	 remain	within	areas	of	economic,	 tourist	and	social	activities.	The	historic	 centre	has	
two	of	 the	most	 notorious	 ‘no-go’	 areas	 for	 outsiders:	Tepito	 ‘the	 fierce	 neighbourhood’,	
and	 La	 Merced,	 the	 largest	 traditional	 food	 market	 area	 in	 the	 country.	 Tepito	 has	 a	
worldwide	 reputation	 for	 commercialising	 stolen	goods,	 counterfeit	products,	drugs,	arms	
or	even	hit	men	 for	hire.	Despite	 its	problems,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 sense	of	 community	and	
pride	among	its	residents,	who	have	kept	the	neighbourhood	out	of	the	authorities’	control	
and	have	resisted	state	intervention	for	decades.	On	the	other	hand,	La	Merced,	an	area	for	
traditional	food	market	distribution,	has	gained	a	‘no-go’	status	in	recent	past	decades.	The	
area	has	been	 in	clear	decline	since	a	new	 food	distribution	centre	was	built	 in	1982;	 the	
area	was	affected	during	the	1985	earthquake,	and	a	fire	in	the	late	1980s	killed	dozens	of	
merchants.		
	
La	Merced	has	also	become	more	dangerous	due	to	a	combination	of	changes	in	social	and	
economic	 dynamics	 in	 the	 city	 and	 the	 increase	 of	 organised	 crime	 presence,	 which	
contributed	to	depopulation	of	the	area.	Yet	we	argue	that	the	fundamental	factor	in	these	
changes	 has	 been	 the	 effective	 abandonment	 of	 the	 state’s	 investment	 in	 infrastructure,	
security	and	maintenance	of	 the	public	market	buildings,	 the	public	 space,	and	social	and	
cultural	 facilities,	 over	 a	 period	 of	 years.	 Since	 the	 1980s,	 there	 have	 been	 ‘patterns	 of	
withdrawal,	avoidance	and	defunding’	in	La	Merced.	However,	its	location	in	the	middle	of	
the	city	still	attracts	over	100,000	visitors	daily.	The	economic	dynamism	of	this	area	can	be	
contrasted	with	serious	problems	such	as	drug	and	human	trafficking,	unsanitary	conditions	
for	 a	 large	 population	 of	 prostitutes,	 and	 increasing	 rates	 of	 violence,	 crime	 and	
homelessness.			
	
		
These	 problems	 increased	 in	 the	 2000s	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 an	 ambitious	
regeneration	 strategy	 promoted	 by	 Mexico	 City’s	 government,	 in	 combination	 with	 the	
private	sector,	which	expelled	street	vendors,	homeless	and	others	out	of	the	touristic	area	
of	the	historic	Centre.	A	significant	number	of	them	found	space	in	La	Merced.	According	to	
Davis	(2013),	in	early	2002,	a	group	of	‘powerful	local	businessmen	hired	former	New	York	
mayor	 Rudolph	 Giuliani	 as	 a	 consultant’	 (Davis,	 2013:54).	 The	 result	 of	 his	 evaluation	 of	
Mexico	City’s	security	problems	was	a	strategy	of	‘zero	tolerance’	akin	to	New	York’s	earlier	
experiments,	 which	 meant	 small	 crimes	 would	 become	 a	 priority.	 The	 local	 government	
welcomed	the	report	with	146	recommendations.	Critics	of	the	proposals	saw	this	strategy	
as	 a	 way	 to	 criminalise	 poverty	 by	 removing	 street	 vending,	 prostitution,	 drug	 dealers,	
“franeleros”	 (people	 who	 watch	 parked	 cars),	 the	 homeless	 and	 many	 other	 actors	 that	
would	affect	the	image	of	the	city	and	real	estate	development	interests.	One	of	the	main	
beneficiaries	 of	 the	 strategy	was	 Carlos	 Slim,	 the	 telecommunications	millionaire	with	 an	
important	amount	of	properties	in	the	area.	The	displacement	strategy	proved	successful	in	
terms	of	revalorisation	of	the	touristic	perimeter	of	the	city	centre,	but	increased	tensions	in	
other	areas	like	La	Merced.		
	
The	importance	of	La	Merced	as	a	commercial	site	existed	since	pre-Hispanic	times	(Castillo-	
Berthier,	 1983).	 However,	 the	 modern	 marketplace	 originated	 as	 a	 Mercado	 popular	
(market	 for	 the	people)	 in	 the	 ruins	of	 the	 convent	of	 the	Order	of	Our	 Lady	of	Mercy	 in	
1861.	 Since	 its	origins,	 the	 commercial	 success	was	accompanied	by	 congestion	problems	
for	 not	 having	 enough	 space	 for	 all	 merchants.	 There	 have	 been	 three	 important	
interventions:	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 the	marketplace	was	 relocated	 in	 order	 to	 receive	
more	 merchants;	 in	 1957,	 as	 part	 of	 an	 ambitious	 public	 market	 policy,	 a	 new	 modern	
		
building	opened;	and	 in	 the	1980s	and	1990s,	new	commercial	 ‘plazas’	 or	 shopping	malls	
were	 built	 in	 the	 area	 to	 bring	 street	 vendors	 inside.	 However,	 this	 last	 effort	 was	 not	
successful;	most	of	these	plazas	are	used	as	storage	units,	and	most	of	the	merchants	work	
in	the	streets	where	customers	pass	by.		
	
The	 complexity	 of	 La	Merced	 as	 a	 shopping	 area	 includes	 several	 public	 and	 semi-public	
buildings	offering	different	products	from	fruits	and	vegetables	to	herbal	medicine	or	plastic	
flowers,	surrounded	by	tower	blocks,	abandoned	buildings,	and	low-quality	housing	where	
illicit	 activities	 happen.	 The	 process	 of	 regeneration	 of	 the	 touristic	 part	 of	 the	 historic	
centre	has	arguably	contributed	to	the	increase	of	street	vendors	 in	La	Merced,	creating	a	
barricaded	 area	 where	 most	 mobility	 is	 now	 done	 by	 metro,	 buses	 and	 walking.	 The	
impenetrability	of	the	area	is	partly	due	to	the	presence	of	semi-fixed	metal	stalls	that	block	
access	 to	 cars.	 The	 blockade	 increased	 after	 a	 huge	 fire	 consumed	1,000	 stalls	 inside	 the	
Nave	Mayor	 in	 2013,	 the	main	 public	market	 building	 in	 the	 area.	Merchants	 had	 to	 be	
relocated	in	tents	placed	in	the	adjacent	streets.	The	fire	exacerbated	the	tensions	between	
different	 groups	 and	 conflicts	 increased.	Although	Tepito	and	 La	Merced	are	 some	of	 the	
most	dangerous	areas	in	the	City	Centre,	actions	to	combat	crime	have	been	limited.	There	
have	been	a	few	raids	in	Tepito	to	combat	drug	trafficking	and	to	confiscate	pirate	CDs	and	
DVDs,	but	 little	that	might	more	effectively	challenge	such	trades.	 In	La	Merced,	since	the	
construction	 of	 the	 plazas	 in	 the	 1990s,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 progressive	 decrease	 in	 state	
presence	to	deal	with	insecurity,	maintain	public	markets	or	combat	organised	crime.		
	
After	 the	 2013	 fire	 in	Nave	Mayor,	 La	Merced,	 a	 ‘Master	 Plan	 to	 rescue	 La	Merced’	was	
announced,	and	experts	in	academic,	private,	social	and	public	sectors	were	invited	to	take	
		
part.	Unfortunately,	the	plan	was	never	published	and	the	overall	intentions	to	improve	the	
conditions	of	 those	who	 live	and	work	 there	have	not	materialised.	Those	 involved	 in	 the	
process	of	building	the	master	plan	share	the	frustration	over	how	things	were	conducted.	
For	 starters,	 the	 state	 had	 abandoned	 the	 area	 for	 such	 a	 long	 time	 that	 residents	 and	
vendors	 were	 strongly	 predisposed	 against	 this	 type	 of	 regeneration	 project	 (particularly	
those	who	had	seen	the	displacement	and	gentrification	of	the	first	regeneration	strategy).	
Second,	 local	authorities	did	not	 recognise	 the	 immediate	needs	of	 stakeholders	after	 the	
fire,	which	only	fostered	distrust	and	rumours	of	displacement	and	destruction.	One	of	the	
urban	 planners	 involved	 in	 the	 project	 considers	 that	 the	 rescue	 plan	 had	 a	 bad	 start	
because	it	was	based	on	ideas	defined	on	the	comfort	of	a	desk,	rather	than	listening	to	the	
real	 demands	 that	 merchants	 and	 residents	 shared	 during	 the	 visits	 and	 consultation	
meetings,	such	as	bad	lighting	in	streets,	insufficient	policing,	deficient	waste	management,	
insufficient	sewage	capacity,	irregular	running	water	provision,	insufficient	health	and	safety	
conditions,	 and	 improvised	 electrical	 connections.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 according	 to	 this	
interviewee	who	 attended	 all	 seven	 public	 consultation	 sessions,	 there	was	 a	 patronising	
attitude	 of	 bringing	 experts	 who	 told	 the	 local	 community	 what	 they	 needed	 instead	 of	
listening	to	their	needs	and	concerns.		
	
Another	interviewee	who	was	in	charge	of	one	of	the	data	gathering	teams	expressed	that	
most	 of	 the	 people	 she	 encountered	 during	 fieldwork	 felt	 that	 the	 local	 government	 had	
abandoned	them	for	such	a	long	time,	they	had	to	survive	on	their	own	terms.	The	‘rescue’	
project	in	their	eyes	was	an	excuse	to	clean	streets	from	informal	vendors	but	also	to	expel	
them	 from	 the	 established	 marketplaces.	 The	 slow	 response	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 burned-
down	 area	 of	 over	 two	 years	 has	 confirmed	 their	 fears.	 People	 in	 the	 area	 have	 taken	
		
control	 of	 their	 own	problems.	Churches	 look	 after	 the	homeless,	 local	 cultural	 initiatives	
like	La	Carpa	and	Keren-tá	are	looking	after	the	youngest	population,	and	merchants	have	
united	 to	 fight	 crime	 in	 the	 area,	 negotiating	 with	 delinquents.	 The	 withdrawal	 of	 the	
master	 plan	 not	 only	 shows	 the	 incapacity	 of	 the	 local	 government	 to	 connect	 with	 the	
community,	but	also	the	power	behind	the	illegal	activities	that	exist,	particularly	one	that	
no	 one	 wants	 to	 talk	 about:	 human	 trafficking.	 It	 seems	 like	 there	 cannot	 be	 a	 ‘rescue’	
unless	 the	state	recognises	 that	 it	abandoned	(Angotti,	Becker	and	Muller,	2013)	 the	area	
some	time	ago	and	that	this	has	now	created	a	more	sustained	threat	to	the	sovereignty	of	
the	city	government,	as	the	area	has	learned	to	survive	apart	from	the	wider	body	politic.		
	
4.	Conclusion	
	
Autotomy	 refers	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 some	 animals	 to	 amputate	 limbs	 when	 threatened	 by	
predators	 in	 order	 to	 affect	 escape	 under	 such	 emergency	 conditions.	 In	 this	 article,	 we	
have	sought	to	develop	understandings	of	public	space	and	city/neighbourhood	governance	
using	 this	 metaphor	 of	 ejection	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 strategic	 reflex	 action	 by	 threatened	
governments,	citizens	and	private	service	providers.	Neighbourhoods	are	ejected	in	more	or	
less	 stringent	 and	 modulating	 ways	 through	 the	 actions	 and	 designations	 of	 policing	
agencies,	national	and	local	governments,	citizens	and	private	service	providers.	The	idea	of	
autotomic	space	thus	offers	a	potentially	fruitful	means	of	locating	strategic	and	temporary	
cessations	 of	 control,	 patterns	 of	 under-spending	 and	 policing	 avoidance,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
process	 of	 suspending	 assurances	 of	 citizenship	 in	 order	 to	 counter	 the	 fiscal	 costs	 of	
maintaining	control	 that	are	more	subtle	 than	the	designation	of	simple	no-go	areas.	One	
advantage	 of	 this	 perspective	 is	 that	 it	 assists	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 territorial	
		
disengagement	can	be	used	as	a	weapon	in	the	armoury	of	neoliberal	states	faced	with	the	
growing	costs	of	maintaining	order	and	social	control	in	‘unruly	spaces’.	Such	strategies	also	
appear	 to	 legitimate	 state	withdrawal	 via	 resulting	 spatial	 stigma,	while	 helping	 privatise	
and	secure	the	more	protected	‘policed	community’.	
	
We	 have	 used	 the	 idea	 of	 autotomic	 space	 to	 identify	 the	 socio-spatial	 expulsion	 of	
neighbourhoods	and	other	 locales,	 conducted	as	a	 form	of	 triage	governance,	 in	order	 to	
maintain	the	health	of	the	wider	urban	body	politic	–	ensuring	its	fiscal	vitality	and	safety	by	
cutting	off	the	costs	of	maintaining	high	poverty	and	unruly	districts.	This	strand	of	control	
through	policing	absences,	 fiscal	 foreclosures	and	citizen	avoidances	 is	paradoxical	since	 it	
stands	 in	 contrast	 to	 public	 pronouncements	 of	 police/state	 sovereignty	 and	 other	
assurances	 of	 the	 full	 and	 extensive	 power	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	 agencies.	 The	 resulting	
combination	 of	 a	 divestment	 of	 public	 assets,	 reductions	 in	 public	 service	 provisions,	
disrespectful	street-level	bureaucrats,	police	no-go	designations,	uninsurable	property,	low	
security,	 little	 or	 no	 public	 transport	 and	withdrawals	 of	 private	 services	 (such	 pizza	 and	
other	 deliveries,	 private	 postal	 services	 and	 so	 on)	 has	 created	 decaying	 spaces	 in	which	
residents	feel	a	sense	of	shame	or	indignity	and	where	surplus	populations	are	warehoused	
in	order	 to	minimise	 the	 fiscal	 ‘overhead’	 they	 represent	 to	 the	state.	These	points	are	 in	
line	with	recent	arguments	about	the	systemic	production	of	forms	of	citizen	expulsion	that	
emerge	 via	 the	 kind	 of	 privatisation,	 financial	 and	 land	 appropriation	 appearing	 under	
advanced	 neoliberalism.	 As	 we	 move	 further	 into	 the	 greater	 recognition	 of	 modes	 of	
paradoxical	 citizenship/spatial	 abandonment,	 the	 lines	 of	 crossover	 between	 notions	 of	
such	expulsion	and	the	idea	of	autotomic	space	appear	to	be	fruitful.	
	
		
Through	 our	 two	 illustrative	 case	 studies,	 we	 have	 sought	 to	 elaborate	 the	 concept	 of	
autotomic	space,	arguing	 that	such	spatial	and	social	designations	are	often	 temporary	or	
shifting	in	nature	–	the	no-go	areas	created	by	riots	may	flare-up	for	a	day	or	two,	the	no-go	
estate	may	be	de-policed	for	months	or	more,	an	insurgent	province	or	region	cordoned	off	
for	 several	 years.	 Critically,	 because	 of	 their	 delegitimising	 force	 in	 public	 discourse	 and	
discriminatory	power,	such	patterns	are	invariably	denied	by	state	actors,	local	authorities,	
policing	agencies	and	private	service	providers.	Our	case	examples,	the	historic	no-go	areas	
of	Northern	Ireland	and	the	strategic	abandonment	and	failed	attempt	to	reclaim	informal	
commercial	 and	 illicit	 space	 in	 Mexico	 City	 usefully	 illustrate	 the	 shifting	 patterns	 of	
engagement,	withdrawal	and	disbarring	that	form	the	basis	of	powerful	autotomic	logics	in	
which	 areas	 and	populations	 are	 subject	 to	 emergency	 conditions	of	 control	 operating	 to	
subtract	 segments	 of	 the	 body	 politic	 from	 the	 city.	 The	 no-go	 area	 thus	 exemplifies	 not	
only	resistance	to	authority	as	is	commonly	understood,	but	also	the	deployment	of	a	kind	
of	power	that	stems	from	disregard.	
	
The	colonisation	of	public	space	requires	an	intense	and	ongoing	collaboration	of	the	state	
with	its	policing	agents,	but	this	can	never	be	a	totalising	or	complete	solution	to	disorderly	
publics	or	apparently	unruly	spaces.	Social	and	territorial	domination	rely	on	the	capacity	to	
respond	with	no	response	–	with	a	cessation	of	policing,	with	ghettoising	forms	of	housing	
provision	and	a	willingness	to	deny	citizens	their	rights.	These	strategies	seem	to	be	applied	
more	 often	 and	with	 greater	 vigour	 in	 societies	 and	 cities	 characterised	 by	more	 intense	
material	 inequalities	 and	 strains	on	 fiscal	 sustainability.	Within	 a	wider	 social	 politics	 that	
has	generated	social	animosity	between	groups	 in	 increasingly	unequal	cities,	a	search	for	
security	by	the	affluent	also	appears	to	aid	the	energies	of	the	polity,	directed	at	attempts	
		
to	neutralise,	defund,	withdraw	or	otherwise	eject	 common	spaces	 in	order	 to	pacify	and	
remove	 possible	 threats.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 stigmatised	 and	 defamed	
neighbourhoods	 often	 manifest	 a	 strong	 opposition	 to	 state-capital	 re-incorporation	
strategies	designed	to	erase	existing	oppositional	cultural	and	political	identities	and/or	the	
livelihoods	 of	 workers	 and	 their	 dependents	 in	 the	 informal	 and	 illicit	 economy	 (Feltran,	
2011).	
	
Through	governmentalities	of	social	sorting	and	highly	stigmatising	media	narratives	of	self-
induced	poverty	and	moral	failure,	marginal	populations	have	been	woven	into	narratives	of	
abject	 spaces	 with	 little	 capacity	 to	 challenge	 such	 descriptions.	 Autotomic	 space	 thus	
satisfies	 a	 broader	 process	 of	 socio-political	 and	 economic	 triage	 (lose/abandon	 space	 to	
take	better	control	of	what	is	left)	while	at	the	same	time	serving	the	ideological	purpose	of	
disparaging	 the	 victims	 as	 agents,	 deserving	 their	 fate.	 The	 kinds	 of	 spatial	 containment	
produced	 by	 such	 strategies	 engage	 scripts	 of	 capital-state	 encampment	 and	 revanchist	
controls,	as	unruly	publics	and	spaces	become	increasingly	withdrawn	from	membership	of	
the	neoliberal	polity	and	the	promise	of	any	tangible	right	to	the	city.	
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